CROI 2026: The Tools Are Here. The Infrastructure Is Not.
The 33rd Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections (CROI) convened February 22nd – 25th in Denver under extraordinary tension between a pipeline of HIV prevention, treatment, and potential cure tools that could reshape the epidemic's trajectory, and a global funding crisis actively dismantling the infrastructure required to deliver any of it. As Conference Chair Nicolas Chomont of the Université de Montréal stated in the Opening Session, "we share a responsibility to defend and sustain funding for international HIV programs and research." That charge framed every session that followed.
The Funding Crisis: New Data on the Damage
The consequences of disruptions to the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the dissolution of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and National Institutes of Health (NIH) cuts are no longer hypothetical. The CROI session "Sleepless in Denver" presented the first systematic evidence of the damage. Ellen Brazier's survey data from the International epidemiology Databases to Evaluate AIDS (IeDEA) consortium found that across 32 countries, 47% of clinics reported disruptions in HIV services, with similar rates of disruption to medication availability, laboratory services, and clinic operations. In KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, Lindsey Filiatreau reported that 39% of clinics experienced disruptions affecting an estimated 830,000 people living with HIV.
The damage is not confined overseas. Aaron Richterman presented data from a rapid survey across three U.S. states showing that 47% of clinics reported HIV service disruptions, including medication shortages. He also demonstrated how cuts to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the country's largest targeted anti-poverty program serving more than 42 million Americans, directly undermine treatment outcomes. During the 2025 government shutdown, ART adherence among people living with HIV who receive SNAP benefits dropped to as low as 40%. The connection between food security and viral suppression is well established; cutting one predictably undermines the other. As Filiatreau put it, "These things [HIV services]… can be taken away overnight, but they can't be rebuilt overnight."
Prevention: An Expanding Toolkit, a Widening Access Gap
Against this backdrop, CROI delivered a prevention portfolio that is broader and stronger than at any previous conference. Final results from the PURPOSE 1 and PURPOSE 2 trials confirmed the efficacy of twice-yearly injectable lenacapavir for pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). In PURPOSE 1, which enrolled cisgender adolescent and young women in sub-Saharan Africa, HIV incidence among lenacapavir recipients was 0.07 per 100 person-years, compared to 1.98 for oral emtricitabine/tenofovir alafenamide (F/TAF) and 1.94 for emtricitabine/tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (F/TDF), with only two seroconversions among more than 2,000 participants. PURPOSE 2, enrolling men who have sex with men and gender diverse people, showed HIV incidence of 0.11 per 100 person-years for lenacapavir versus 0.92 for F/TDF, with three seroconversions among 2,179 participants.
The five total seroconversions across both studies received considerable attention, with four showing lenacapavir-associated resistance mutations that researchers believe developed during PrEP rather than being transmitted. Research into why these breakthroughs occurred is ongoing. As Gilead's Stephanie Cox stated, "We don't know why these occurred… I think the efficacy is very high." San Francisco AIDS Foundation (SFAF) Medical Director Hyman Scott, MD, MPH, added context: "The breakthrough infections are important to evaluate but are extremely rare among the thousands of study participants."
The Prévenir study's final eight-year results from France reinforced that both daily and on-demand oral PrEP are safe and effective, with overall HIV incidence of 0.11 per 100 person-years across more than 3,200 users and 13,000 person-years of follow-up. Switching between daily and on-demand use was the norm rather than the exception, with 59% of daily users changing to on-demand at least once, and 52% doing the reverse. This carries a clear message for implementation: people need flexibility, and rigid one-size prescribing undermines persistence.
The prevention pipeline continues to expand. Merck's once-monthly oral PrEP candidate MK-8527 selected an 11 mg dose maintaining protective drug levels in at least 95% of participants, with Phase 3 EXPrESSIVE trials now enrolling. Gilead's PURPOSE 365 study, testing once-yearly lenacapavir for PrEP, is being designed. The SEARCH study showed that community health workers paired with digital tools reduced HIV incidence by 70% in rural populations, a reminder that prevention tools work best when embedded in community-driven delivery.
The problem is reach. Andrew Hill highlighted that only 2.3 million people are currently on oral PrEP, far below UNAIDS targets, and that injectable cabotegravir and lenacapavir represent just 2.9% and 0.9% of total PrEP use, respectively. We have a growing menu of prevention tools. Getting them to the people who need them is where the system breaks down.
Treatment: More Options, Longer Intervals, Patient Choice
The treatment pipeline at CROI 2026 moved toward a central goal: giving people living with HIV more choices that fit their lives. Merck presented late-breaking data from three Phase 3 trials of doravirine/islatravir (DOR/ISL), the first ever once-daily, non-INSTI two-drug regimen. In treatment-naive adults, DOR/ISL demonstrated non-inferiority to bictegravir/emtricitabine/tenofovir alafenamide (BIC/FTC/TAF), with 91.8% achieving viral suppression at Week 48 compared to 90.6%, including participants with high viral loads and low CD4 counts. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has set an action date of April 28, 2026 for the DOR/ISL application. For people aging with HIV who manage multiple comorbidities, a two-drug, non-INSTI regimen addresses a real clinical gap. Research presented at this same conference linked the widely used INSTI dolutegravir to neuropsychiatric effects, including blocking a brain enzyme essential for memory and emotional regulation, with one study halted for ethical reasons after participants experienced worsening symptoms. For people navigating tolerability concerns, toxicity issues, or polypharmacy, having a non-INSTI alternative with fewer active agents matters.
Gilead's ARTISTRY-1 and ARTISTRY-2 trials demonstrated that a bictegravir/lenacapavir (BIC/LEN) single-tablet regimen can maintain viral suppression for people switching from complex multi-tablet regimens (96% at 48 weeks in ARTISTRY-1) or from Biktarvy (93.5% in ARTISTRY-2). For people who have been on complex regimens for years due to resistance histories, this potential simplification addresses a real quality-of-life gap. Gilead plans to submit these results to regulatory authorities.
Long-acting injectables continued their forward march. In ViiV Healthcare's EMBRACE study, lotivibart (a broadly neutralizing antibody, or bNAb) given as an IV infusion every four months plus monthly cabotegravir maintained viral suppression in 94% of participants at 12 months. Part 2 of EMBRACE, testing lotivibart infusions every six months, is now fully enrolled. ViiV also presented early data on VH-184, a third-generation integrase inhibitor with potential twice-yearly dosing, and VH-499, a capsid inhibitor supporting twice-yearly intervals. The VOLITION study showed that 85% of treatment-naive adults opted to switch from daily pills to bimonthly long-acting cabotegravir/rilpivirine (CAB+RPV LA), with 95% maintaining suppression. Data like VOLITION's 85% opt-in rate reinforce what the HIV community has long argued: when people living with HIV are offered options that fit their lives, they take them. Payers, formulary committees, and ADAP programs should take note. Treatment is not one-size-fits-all, and coverage shouldn’t treat it as such.
Community activist Shari Margolese put it plainly at CROI's final Community Breakfast Club: "As a community we need to get much angrier about the fact that we can't get access to the drugs." Francois Venter of Ezintsha in South Africa warned that without action, "we might be sitting here again in 10 years' time" celebrating breakthroughs that never reach communities.
Cure, Comorbidities, and the Equity Question
On the cure front, the RIO trial's Phase B results offered genuine encouragement. Among the 28 people who received a placebo in Phase A and were then given bNAbs teropavimab and zinlirvimab, 54% had prolonged viral remission after stopping antiretroviral therapy (ART), with two still off treatment after more than a year. Because ART was stopped six months after the bNAb infusions, these results point to an immunological "vaccinal effect" rather than direct viral suppression. A cure remains distant, but these are the kinds of incremental, well-designed steps that build the evidence base forward.
CROI also highlighted the growing urgency of managing comorbidities in aging populations living with HIV. The POPPY study found that depression affects 32.4% of people living with HIV over 50, linked to inflammatory markers rather than psychosocial factors alone. A study of over 1,500 men showed that the combination of age 65 and over, HIV, and metabolic syndrome produced significantly worse cognitive impairment than any factor alone. Metabolic syndrome is the modifiable factor in that triad, which means clinicians and patients can act on it now. CROI data on GLP-1 receptor agonists like semaglutide point toward a potential tool for doing so: in a study of people living with HIV-associated lipohypertrophy, semaglutide produced a 19% reduction in total body fat, a 31% decrease in visceral adipose tissue, and a nearly 50% drop in C-reactive protein, a key inflammatory marker. Separate data presented at the conference found that semaglutide did not worsen depression in people living with HIV, and that people with moderate or severe depression at baseline actually showed improvements. These findings warrant dedicated research into how GLP-1 therapies can address the long-term health consequences of chronic inflammation and aging with HIV. If the evidence continues to support their role, GLP-1 receptor agonists should be evaluated for inclusion in the HIV standard of care, with appropriate insurance and program coverage to match.
The equity question came into sharp focus with data from the ENCORE cohort. Black trans women in the U.S. had an HIV incidence of 15.5 per 1,000 person-years, compared to 1.4 for White trans women. Poverty, houselessness, and lack of insurance were significant drivers, and only 4% of trans women in the cohort used long-acting injectable PrEP. Dr. Sari Reisner of the University of Michigan warned that the current administration's erasure of gender identity data from federally funded datasets will make it harder to monitor disparities and determine what works. We cannot close gaps we refuse to measure, and they know that.
What Comes Next
CROI 2026 produced a clear picture: we have tools that can change the course of the HIV epidemic, and the systems required to deliver them are being actively undermined. The path forward requires specific action. We must defend and restore funding for PEPFAR, NIH, and the global HIV infrastructure that makes science reach people. State ADAP programs and payers must expand coverage for long-acting prevention and treatment options and remove administrative barriers that delay access. To do that, they need to be adequately funded. PrEP implementation must embrace the full range of validated modalities, from daily oral to on-demand to injectable to monthly oral, with flexibility built into delivery. Care for people aging with HIV must shift toward whole-person approaches that integrate cognitive screening, metabolic risk management, and mental health support alongside viral suppression. And we must protect the community-led surveillance and data collection that allows us to see and respond to disparities, especially for trans and gender-diverse communities.
Wes Sundquist of the University of Utah, who helped develop the science behind lenacapavir, reflected at CROI on the decades-long journey that produced this tool. He warned that while the field now has "a really powerful new tool in the arsenal," forces are blocking its use. "It will be a human tragedy," he said, "if we don't overcome those." The science has done its part. The rest is a question of political will, policy design, and whether we as a community can sustain the pressure long enough for these tools to reach the people who need them.
The HIV Care System Is Breaking Before Congress Even Cuts It
In October 2025, the Emergency HIV Clinical Response Task Force surveyed 526 HIV clinicians across the United States. Seventy percent reported service disruptions affecting their patients, with the Midwest and South hit hardest at 77% and 71%. Gender-affirming care topped the list of disrupted services at 33%, followed by housing support at 26% and PrEP or PEP access at 25%. Transgender people and immigrants bore the heaviest impact, with 41% and 38% of clinicians reporting these populations were most affected.
These numbers tell an important story, but not the one many headlines suggest. The disruptions in this survey are not the result of Congressional budget cuts to HIV programs. No legislation has eliminated Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program funding or CDC prevention dollars. Instead, they stem from administrative actions, grant recissions, and bureaucratic obstruction that destabilized HIV services months before Congress debated any cuts at all.
That distinction matters. It reveals how vulnerable the HIV care infrastructure has become, and how much worse things could get if proposed eliminations of HIV programs and broader healthcare funding cuts move forward.
The Administrative Stranglehold
The current disruptions trace directly to Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought’s systematic manipulation of the federal budget process. Before joining the Trump administration, Vought outlined these tactics in Project 2025, describing how “apportioned funding” could “ensure consistency with the President’s agenda.” He has executed this strategy with surgical precision.
Rather than releasing appropriated funds to agencies like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in standard apportionments, Vought shifted to monthly releases requiring Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) review for every grant award. By August 2025, the CDC’s center for HIV and tuberculosis prevention had spent $167 million less than historical averages, the Ryan White Program underspent by $105 million, and mental health funds at the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration lagged by more than $860 million.
The money exists. Congress appropriated it. Administrative roadblocks are what prevent it from reaching clinics, health departments, and community organizations.
The human cost is visible in provider reports. When funding delays hit in July 2025, 81 HIV organizations wrote to HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. warning that “with every day of delayed FY2025 funding release, the delivery of essential HIV services is compromised.” Clinics laid off case managers, reduced clinician hours, closed sites, and scaled back hotlines. The funds eventually arrived about a month later, but the damage—to staff capacity, patient trust, and continuity of care—was done.
At St. John AIDS outreach ministry in New Orleans, program director Tamachia Davenport faced a choice: cut staff or cut supplies when CDC funds did not arrive on time. To keep staff from fleeing to more stable jobs, she stopped buying condoms the organization distributes to prevent sexually transmitted infections—despite Louisiana’s already high rates of HIV, chlamydia, and gonorrhea, and the fact that condoms cost far less than treating any of them.
One CDC official summarized the view from inside: “Everyone’s inbox is full of letters from grant recipients asking, ‘How do we proceed?’ We just say, ‘Please wait.’”
Robert Gordon, a public policy specialist at Georgetown University and former assistant finance secretary at HHS, described the strategy plainly: “This is a sophisticated strategy to cause money to lapse and then say, ‘If they can’t spend it, they don’t need it.’”
The Unlegislated Threat
While administrative actions create the current disruptions, proposed legislation in Congress represents a qualitatively different threat.
In September 2025, the House Appropriations Committee released its FY2026 funding bill eliminating all CDC HIV prevention funding—approximately $1 billion—and cutting the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program by $525 million, or 20%.
The bill does not merely trim budgets. It eliminates program components entirely. Ryan White Part F, including AIDS Education and Training Centers, the Dental Reimbursement Program, and the Minority AIDS Initiative, would disappear. The $220 million for the Ending the HIV Epidemic initiative would be eliminated. Direct grants to more than 400 HIV clinics providing care and treatment through Ryan White Parts C and D would end.
Carl Schmid, executive director of the HIV+Hepatitis Policy Institute, summed up the stakes: “This is not a bill for making America healthy again, but a disastrous bill that will reignite HIV in the United States.”
The Senate tells a different story. In July 2025, the Senate Appropriations Committee advanced a bipartisan bill that maintains flat funding for all parts of the Ryan White Program ($2.57 billion), level funding at $220 million for Ending the HIV Epidemic, and flat funding for CDC HIV prevention. The contrast could not be clearer.
Researchers at Johns Hopkins Medicine modeled what would happen if federal funding for Ryan White ended. Their study in the Annals of Internal Medicine projects 75,436 additional HIV infections through 2030, a 49% increase. As senior author, Dr. Todd Fojo noted, effective treatment is the most powerful form of HIV prevention.
No final FY2026 budget has been enacted. The government is operating under a continuing resolution, and the gap between House and Senate proposals is unresolved. But the threat is not hypothetical, and the clinician survey’s forward-looking data reflects it: 72% anticipate moderate or significant service disruptions in the next 6–12 months, rising to 77% for the following 12–18 months.
The Broader Ecosystem Under Siege
The clinician survey captures disruptions to direct HIV services, but not the compounding pressures from Medicaid restructuring that threaten both coverage for people living with HIV and the financial stability of AIDS service organizations.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed July 4, 2025, reduces Medicaid expansion eligibility from 138% to 100% of the federal poverty level, affecting an estimated 200,000 people with HIV. This is not a marginal tweak: 40% of non-elderly adults with HIV rely on Medicaid, nearly three times the rate of the general population. Starting in 2027, adults ages 19–64, captured under the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, must complete 80 hours per month of approved activities to maintain coverage, and semi-annual eligibility redeterminations will replace annual reviews, injecting churn into programs where uninterrupted access to antiretroviral therapy is a clinical requirement, not a luxury.
Program eligibility recertification as an administrative burden on patients and otherwise a deterrent to staying enrolled in a program is something Ryan White clients are exceedingly familiar with. Recall, in 2021, under a Policy Clarification Notice (PCN 21-02), historical 6-month recertification requirements were relaxed in order to facilitate keeping eligible clients in care and not losing patients to care because of paperwork burdens. Medicaid work requirements as described in HR1 are the exact opposite of this best practice.
Taken under another lens, many AIDS service organizations converted to Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC) status after the Affordable Care Act to serve newly insured patients and stabilize revenue. Medicaid comprises 43% of FQHC revenue. The OBBBA cuts into this income through provider tax caps that ratchet down over time and by capping state-directed payments at 100% of Medicare rates in expansion states. At the same time, the Congressional Budget Office projects 7.8 million people will lose Medicaid coverage overall. Enhanced ACA premium tax credits expire at the end of 2025, and so far Congress has not extended them.
As Davenport of St. John AIDS outreach told KFF Health News, “A lot of us are having to rob Peter to pay Paul.” But what happens when Peter gets defunded? Maybe the “Good Christians” in the halls of Congress can tell us.
Another angle of “robbing Peter”, is state expansion of 340B by way of allowing Medicaid providers to opt for any given claim under the 340B program, rather than forcing the claim through Medicaid. In these scenarios, the provider benefits the most from 340B discounts while robbing the state’s Medicaid program of possible Medicaid Drug rebates because no single claim may receive both. One report tied this Medicaid divestment to the tune of $1.2 billion annually. A novel consideration might be stabilization of Medicaid programs and payments by way of disallowing the option of 340B claims and requiring those claims be passed through a state Medicaid program. Maximizing Medicaid’s re-investment opportunity stabilizes both state budgets and the payment ecosystem for qualified healthcare entities.
Ground Truth: What’s Happening Now
Local decisions layered on top of federal obstruction are already shutting people out of care. Institutional brain trust and community trust in those same institutions is easy to lose and hard to recover.
In Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, the public health department laid off six workers, including half its disease investigators, when HIV prevention and surveillance grants expired at the end of May with no information about future funding. The grants were restored a month later, but only half the positions were refilled. “So now we’re behind, and cases are still being reported every day that have to be investigated,” said director Raynard Washington.
In Dallas County, Texas, public health director Philip Huang waits for nearly 30% of the promised award for emergency preparedness with no timeline or clarity, making basic staffing decisions feel like a gamble.
Breanne Armbrust, executive director of Richmond’s Neighborhood Resource Center, summed up the cumulative burden on patients: “They’re already sick or in need of care and asking them to do one more thing when their acuity levels might be high is too much, and it’s unreasonable.”
The Warning We Cannot Ignore
The clinician survey documents disruptions caused by administrative obstruction at a time when HIV programs still technically have appropriated funding. It is a snapshot of a system that is already unstable.
If the House FY2026 proposal eliminating CDC prevention funding and cutting Ryan White by $525 million becomes law, these disruptions will not simply “increase,” they could scale into system failure. Each new HIV infection carries an estimated at least $501,000 in lifetime healthcare costs. The Ryan White Program in 2023 achieved a 90.6% viral suppression rate among 576,000 clients. These programs work. Dismantling them would reverse decades of progress in a matter of years.
The workforce crisis compounds the threat. The United States needs 1,500 additional HIV specialists to reach 90-90-90 benchmarks. The South already has only 8 providers per 1,000 people with HIV, compared with 11 nationally. Counties that have reached at least one 90-90-90 target have 13 providers per 1,000. Eliminating AIDS Education and Training Centers, as the House bill proposes, would deepen that shortage just as demand for services intensifies.
None of this is theoretical. Administrative sabotage is already cutting off care people depend on to stay healthy, alive, and connected to treatment. Layer a legislative funding strike on top of a system this fragile, and the outcome is entirely predictable: preventable infections, preventable deaths, and preventable suffering concentrated among people already pushed to the margins.
System Failure: Inside the Collapse of HIV Data Protections
The privacy frameworks that protect people living with HIV—built over decades through advocacy, legislation, and the lived consequences of stigma and surveillance—are now on the brink of collapse. Recent reporting from WIRED reveals that "much of the IT and cybersecurity infrastructure underpinning the nation’s health system is in danger of a possible collapse" following deep staffing cuts at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Agency insiders warn that "within the next couple of weeks, everything regarding IT and cyber at the department will start to reach a point of no return operationally."
These reductions—orchestrated under the banner of "efficiency"—have eliminated the technical expertise necessary to maintain the very systems designed to protect patient information while enabling effective public health response. What took decades of careful negotiation to build could unravel in weeks.
A History of Mistrust and What It Built
In response to early AIDS panic and political scapegoating, HIV reporting systems were designed to protect privacy while still enabling public health surveillance. States initially resisted name-based reporting, opting instead for coded identifiers. These systems directly resulted from community resistance to the idea that a centralized government entity would hold a list of PLWH. By the late 1990s, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) had settled into a delicate dance: collect enough data to direct resources without breaking trust with the communities most impacted.
The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program (RWHAP), created in 1990, is a reflection of this balance. Providers are required to report client-level data annually through the Ryan White Services Report (RSR), but it must be de-identified. Each grantee—whether a city, state, clinic, or community-based organization—must report separately, even if they serve the same client. This redundancy is intentional. It's how we avoid co-mingling funds and how we ensure that data is not aggregated in a way that risks patient re-identification. It’s messy, yes. But it’s designed to protect people, not just count them.
Why It’s So Complicated
At a structural level, RWHAP is segregated by design. Part A grantees are typically cities, Part B is for states, Part C goes to clinics, and Part D supports programs for women, infants, children, and youth. Each grantee and subgrantee reports separately. A person receiving services from a city-funded housing program and a clinic-funded medical program will appear in two different reports. They’ll be encrypted, anonymized, and counted twice—because each program needs its own audit trail. This is not a flaw. It’s a firewall.
It’s also one of the biggest complaints from providers. Clinics and case managers spend untold hours cleaning and submitting the same data to multiple entities for different grants every year. State agencies complain about the burden. But buried underneath the frustration is the reality: these walls are what keep private information from being aggregated, shared, and potentially exposed (or worse, used to target).
Molecular Surveillance and the Reemergence of Privacy Concerns
Parallel to the RSR reporting, the CDC continues to manage HIV surveillance through diagnostic reports, lab data, and increasingly, molecular surveillance—using genomic data from viral samples to track clusters and potential outbreaks. These systems operate independently from care-based reporting systems like the RSR. They’re not supposed to overlap. That’s on purpose.
Molecular surveillance is a powerful tool. It can detect transmission networks, identify gaps in care, and help allocate resources. But it also raises serious privacy concerns. People have no ability to opt out of having their viral sequence data analyzed. Community advocates have raised alarms about how this data could be misused—especially in states with HIV criminalization laws or where public health trust is already low.
When properly separated from care systems, surveillance data can inform public health strategy without endangering patient privacy. But the more these systems are tampered with, neglected, or mismanaged, the greater the risk of privacy breaches and data misuse.
The DOGE Playbook: Gutting Public Health from Within
None of this works without infrastructure. And right now, that infrastructure is being hollowed out.
On April 1, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) laid off roughly 10,000 employees—about 25% of its workforce. That includes entire IT teams, cybersecurity experts, and staff responsible for maintaining the systems that house Ryan White and surveillance data. As WIRED reported, these cuts have left HHS systems teetering on the edge of collapse.
The layoffs were orchestrated by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a Musk-backed initiative with a mandate to slash spending and "modernize" systems. In reality, DOGE operatives have cut critical personnel and attempted to rebuild complex legacy systems—like Social Security's COBOL codebase—without the necessary expertise. As NPR reported, DOGE staff have also sought sweeping access to sensitive federal data, raising serious concerns about the security and ethical use of health information.
A retired Social Security Administration (SSA) official warned that in such a chaotic environment, "others could take pictures of the data, transfer it… and even feed it into AI programs." Given Musk's development of "Grok," concerns have been raised that government health data might be used to "supercharge" his AI without appropriate consent or oversight.
The value of this data—especially when aggregated across systems like HHS, SSA, Veterans Affairs, and the Internal Revenue Service—is enormous. On the black market, a single comprehensive medical record can command up to $1,000 depending on its depth and linkages to other data sets. For commercial AI training, the value is even greater—not in resale, but in the predictive and market power that comes from large, high-quality datasets. If private companies were paying for this kind of dataset, it would cost billions. Musk may be getting it for free—with no consent, no oversight, and no consequences.
Meanwhile, at USAID, funding portals were shut off. Grantees couldn’t access or draw down funds. Even after systems came back online, no one was there to process payments. The same scenario is now playing out at HHS. Grantees have reported delays, missed communications, and uncertainty about reporting requirements—because the people who used to run the systems have been fired.
What's at Stake: Beyond Data Points
The crisis we're witnessing isn't merely technical—it threatens the foundation of HIV services in America. When data systems fail, grants cannot be properly administered. When grants are disrupted, services are compromised. And when privacy protections collapse, people living with HIV may avoid care rather than risk unwanted disclosure of their status.
We've been here before. In the early days of the epidemic, mistrust of government systems drove people away from testing and treatment. The privacy frameworks built into today's reporting systems were designed specifically to overcome that mistrust, enabling effective public health response while respecting human dignity.
A Call for Immediate Action
To address this growing crisis, we need action at multiple levels:
Congress must exercise oversight over DOGE's activities by requiring transparent reporting on HHS staffing changes and their operational impacts, and by establishing strict limits on data access and audit trails to ensure administrative accountability.
HHS must rapidly rehire technical expertise with the institutional knowledge needed to maintain these complex systems before contracts expire and systems fail.
Advocacy organizations should demand clear guardrails on any use of healthcare data, particularly regarding AI applications, including explicit prohibitions on repurposing data collected for public health for commercial training without consent or compensation.
HRSA must immediately address the continuity of the RSR and other reporting systems to ensure grant requirements don't become impossible to meet due to system failures.
But let’s be clear: none of this is a call to keep broken systems frozen in time. Public health data infrastructure can—and should—be modernized. There is real opportunity to streamline reporting, reduce administrative burden, and build tools that serve patients more effectively. But modernization must be done carefully, collaboratively, and with privacy at the center—not with a chainsaw in one hand and a Silicon Valley slogan in the other.
The “move fast and break things” ethos may work for social media startups, but it has no place in systems that safeguard the lives and identities of people living with HIV. What we’re witnessing is not innovation—it’s ideological demolition. The goal isn’t better care or stronger systems. It’s control, profit, and a reckless dismantling of public trust.
The myth that federal IT systems are merely bloated bureaucracies in need of disruption ignores their critical role in protecting sensitive information. Our public health data infrastructure has been built layer by layer, through hard-fought battles over privacy, accountability, and service delivery. Dismantling these systems doesn’t represent modernization—it threatens to erase decades of progress in building frameworks that enable effective care while respecting the rights of people living with HIV.
The privacy architectures designed in response to the early AIDS crisis weren’t just policy innovations—they were survival mechanisms for communities under threat. We cannot afford to let them collapse through neglect, arrogance, or privatized pillaging. The stakes—for millions of Americans receiving care through these programs—couldn't be higher.