When the Target Is SSRIs, the Risk Is the Six Protected Classes
On May 4, 2026, Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. closed a daylong Make America Healthy Again (MAHA) Institute summit on mental health and overmedicalization by announcing a federal initiative to reduce the use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). The package includes new Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) reimbursement codes for clinicians who help patients taper off antidepressants, forthcoming Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) training modules, a technical expert panel to develop deprescribing clinical guidelines, and a "Dear Colleague" letter to providers urging non-pharmacologic alternatives. No major medical organizations participated in the summit. Kennedy described the goal as ending "unnecessary dependence on medication" and returning control to patients. For readers familiar with how Medicare Part D's six protected classes (6PC) have been contested over the past two decades, the announcement reads less as a discrete clinical reform than as a foothold.
What Was Announced, and What the Evidence Says
The administration's framing rests on contested and, in some cases, fabricated premises. Kennedy has claimed, without evidence, that SSRIs are partly responsible for school shootings, a claim he first advanced during his confirmation hearings and repeated at the May 4 summit. He has also stated that SSRIs are harder to quit than heroin. The withdrawal evidence is more measured: a 2019 British study reported 56% of patients experienced withdrawal symptoms, while a 2024 placebo-controlled German analysis found roughly one in six experienced withdrawal effects and about 3% described them as severe. Roughly 16.6% of U.S. adults currently take an SSRI, and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) considers SSRIs a first-line, evidence-based treatment for depression.
The APA called the administration's framing an "oversimplification" that "ignores the larger reality" of access barriers to mental health care. Dr. J. John Mann of the New York State Psychiatric Institute was more direct, telling Reuters that "restricting use of these medications is not justifiable medically". The American Foundation for Suicide Prevention emphasized that decades of clinical, population-level, and health-system data show judicious antidepressant use reduces suicide risk overall.
Some elements of the initiative are defensible. Better tapering support, stronger informed consent, and broader access to talk therapy reflect long-standing clinical recommendations. The concern lies in what surrounds those elements.
A Reported Exploration of a Ban
Four days after the summit, Reuters reported that two sources familiar with internal discussions said HHS officials had explored whether the agency could ban specific drugs within the SSRI class in the week before Kennedy's announcement. HHS spokesman Andrew Nixon denied the discussions had occurred. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not have authority to unilaterally ban approved medications absent new safety evidence, and manufacturers can refuse withdrawal requests, as Amgen did with Tavneos in April 2026. The reporting does not establish that a ban is imminent. It does establish that the agency's internal direction outpaces its public posture.
What the 2004 Black Box Warning Should Teach Us
Federal messaging about antidepressant risk has a documented track record of producing harm. The FDA's 2003 and 2004 advisories, followed by the October 2004 boxed warning on pediatric antidepressants and its 2007 extension to young adults, were based on a meta-analysis never designed to measure suicidality and that recorded no completed suicides. Subsequent research by Stephen Soumerai and Christine Lu found that rates of depression diagnosis, clinical visits, and antidepressant prescribing dropped by roughly one-third, while youth suicide attempts and deaths rose. No study has demonstrated that the warnings improved mental health outcomes. The lesson: federal rhetoric that vilifies a class of medications drives patients away from care, and the patients who disengage are often those at highest risk.
Why This Reaches the Six Protected Classes
Antidepressants are one of six therapeutic classes that Part D plans must cover "all or substantially all" drugs within. The other five are anticonvulsants, antineoplastics, antipsychotics, antiretrovirals, and immunosuppressants. The policy was established through CMS guidance in 2005, codified by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act in 2008, and reinforced by the Affordable Care Act in 2010. It exists because Congress recognized that insurers, left to their own design, would engage in adverse selection against the sickest enrollees.
The 6PC have been targeted before. In January 2014, CMS proposed removing protected status from antidepressants, antipsychotics, and immunosuppressants. The proposal was rescinded within two months after opposition from patient groups, providers, manufacturers, and lawmakers. In May 2018, the first Trump administration's "American Patients First" Blueprint signaled renewed interest in weakening 6PC protections. In January 2021, the CMS Innovation Center released a Part D Payment Modernization Model Request for Applications that would have allowed participating plans to bypass the 6PC requirement for five classes starting in 2022, and for antiretrovirals starting in 2023. The HIV Health Care Access Working Group, of which CANN is a member, warned that restricting antiretrovirals would produce disruptions to care, decreased rates of viral suppression, increased rates of new infections, and more drug resistant strains of HIV. The Biden administration rescinded those changes.
People living with HIV (PLWH) have an immediate stake in this fight. Co-occurring serious mental illness and substance use disorders are common among PLWH, and the same statutory architecture that guarantees access to antiretrovirals also guarantees access to antidepressants and antipsychotics. Erosion of that architecture for one class establishes precedent for the others. A 2024 Health Affairs analysis from Weill Cornell Medicine estimated that removing protected class regulation could have reduced prescription drug spending by approximately $47 billion between 2011 and 2019, a figure that will be cited by anyone seeking to revisit the policy. The savings argument is not hypothetical, and it is not new. What they fail to factor into the equation (or willfully ignore), is that those saved dollars equal lost treatment access for real patients. There is always a cost, this one would be human.
The Pattern Around the Initiative
The SSRI initiative is not arriving into a stable regulatory environment. Since January 2025, HHS has eliminated the Administration for Community Living, the only federal agency dedicated to community living and civil rights for disabled and older Americans. HHS Office for Civil Rights staffing was cut and half of its regional offices closed. On May 12, 2025, the administration paused 2024 final rules requiring insurers to disclose how they restrict mental health claims under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. H.R. 1, signed July 4, 2025, imposed Medicaid work requirements and reduced Medicaid funding by more than $1 trillion over a decade. The Leadership Conference Health Care Task Force described the cumulative effect as a "wholesale assault on public health."
A campaign to reduce SSRI use, taken on its own, would warrant clinical debate. Layered onto this regulatory environment, it warrants vigilance.
What Advocates Should Watch and Do
Several specific actions matter now. First, monitor SAMHSA's forthcoming prescribing trend data and the deprescribing clinical guidelines expected this summer. The language used to justify reduced antidepressant utilization can be repurposed against other protected classes, particularly antipsychotics, which share co-prescribing patterns with antiretrovirals among PLWH with serious mental illness. Second, watch CMS for any Part D rulemaking or demonstration authority that quietly modifies formulary requirements. The 2021 Payment Modernization Model was rescinded because a broad coalition of cancer, HIV, mental health, and disability advocates spoke with one voice; that coalition infrastructure should be reactivated and ready. Third, engage in any HHS comment period touching deprescribing guidance, formulary design, or utilization management. Fourth, document and report plan-level changes affecting antidepressant or antiretroviral access, including new prior authorization requirements or step therapy protocols. Fifth, communicate clearly with patients that current treatments remain covered and that medical decisions belong with them and their clinicians. The chilling effect documented after the 2004 black box warning was driven by media coverage, not by any actual loss of access. We can blunt that effect by keeping accurate information in front of the communities we serve.
For PLWH and the organizations that support them, the connection to Ending the HIV Epidemic is direct. Viral suppression depends on uninterrupted access to the right antiretroviral regimen for each patient, and that access depends on the statutory protections that the 6PC framework provides.
What Comes Next
The SSRI initiative may proceed entirely within the bounds of clinical policy. The deprescribing codes may improve care. The training modules may help clinicians who have long lacked tapering expertise. The protected classes may remain untouched. None of that is guaranteed, and the past eighteen months of HHS reorganization give us no reason to assume the most benign interpretation. What we can do is read the policy direction accurately, engage the regulatory process the way our coalitions have engaged it before, and keep the communities we serve informed. The six protected classes have survived three administrations' attempts to weaken them. Keeping them protected is ongoing work.
Health Inequity: Barriers Caused by Abusive Payer Practices
On February 2, 2023, ProPublica, the publication with a mission to “expose abuses of power” and particularly known for their extraordinary thoroughness of investigation, published a piece exposing United Healthcare’s practices denying medically necessary care for one patient, Christopher McNaughton, who is diagnosed with ulcerative colitis. The barriers caused by abusive payer practices is nothing new to patients living with chronic health conditions, including HIV and viral hepatitis.
McNaughton’s disease state is particularly challenging and his treatment was costing United Healthcare about $2 million per year. McNaughton, after receiving repeated coverage denials of live-improving and life-saving medication from United Healthcare, many appeals, conflicting results from “third-party” medical reviewers, and an insistence from United Healthcare that McNaughton’s care was not “medically necessary”, McNaughton’s family sued. What that lawsuit uncovered was a trove of data, recordings, emails, reports, and more that showed distain for McNaughton’s family seeking the care he needs, a cover up of a review which properly identified the medical necessity for McNaughton’s treatment in alignment with his provider’s recommendations, and even more grossly abusive legal tricks to disrupt and complicate the lawsuit process.
McNaughton receives his insurance coverage through Penn State University, where he goes to school and his parents work. Amid all of the turmoil of navigating denials, McNaughton and his family had reached out to the sponsor of his health cover only to find an extraordinary lack of help. The curious detail there is the university’s “health insurance coordinator” turns out to be a full-time employee of United Healthcare, despite no disclosure of that fact on Penn State’s webpages and the coordinator being assigned both a Penn State email address and phone number. Arguably, as the sponsor of the plan, Penn State has a role to play here, too, much like large employers and even the government in public payer programs.
Similarly, the New York Times covered the issue of payers refusing to cover the cost of high-cost, life-saving care, especially when that care includes newer medications. All the advancements in the world can’t change the course of a person’s life, if they can’t afford those advancements or the cost of those advancements might bankrupt a patient. While some public payer programs help to protect patients from these burdens, with complex regulatory requirements, even those are often farmed out to the same private payer entities responsible for McNaughton’s experiences, or those described by the numerous patients included in New York Times’ piece. For Medicaid, these entities are called managed care organizations (MCOs) and in Medicare they can been under the Medicare Advantage program. For many patients in private plans, formulary restrictions are quite common. This is still also true in Medicaid and Medicare Advantage plans, in which a patient and/or their provider has to chase after a series of costly administrative barriers in order to get an exception, which may or may not be denied at the end of the day. Indeed, MCOs and private payers have a history of refusing to add new medications to formularies, arguing “cost-effectiveness”, despite U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approvals and study designs showing greater efficacy, curative potential, or meeting a unique need. We won’t argue how placing greater value on “cost-savings” in the short-term in the face of more efficacious medication for patients is both morally and ethically abominable. Ultimately, these types of moves just shift cost-burdens to patients, namely in the expense of their health and even their lives. Similarly, newer medications may be placed on higher tiers, requiring higher co-pays or step-therapy (failing a different medication before having access to a newer one). Program designs with high deductibles and copay schemes (sometimes called co-insurance) are leaving more and more patients behind, as evidenced by work from Dr. Jalpa Doshi, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, which showed rates of medication abandonment increase dramatically as co-pays rise.
Digging into the details of navigation, a Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) analysis found Medicare Advantage plans forced patients through the process of securing permission from their payer before getting coverage of care – or as we like to call it, getting care – known as prior authorization. In theory, prior authorizations should align with a patient’s medical necessity as identified by their provider, encourage exploration of less costly treatment courses, and save both the plan and patients some money in the process. In practice, prior authorizations, particularly with regard to medication benefit coverage, is used to delay and deny care very similar to auto insurers looking to get out paying for a claim. KFF’s analysis found that in 2021, Medicare Advantage plans received 35 million prior authorization requests. Medicare Advantage only has 23 million enrollees in the contracts reviewed, thus averaging about 1.5 prior authorization per enrollee. The application of these requests is not uniform. Kaiser Permanente (no affiliation with KFF) had a prior authorization rate of 0.3% per enrollee and Anthem had a rate nearly time times higher at 2.9% per enrollee. To be fair, Kaiser Permanente’s network of providers work at entities Kaiser Permanente owns. The overall denial rate of prior authorizations across Medicare Advantage plans in 2021 was about 5% (or 2 million partial or full denials). Navigating denials, as shown in the ProPublica piece, is more than a little bit challenging when payers are bound and determined to limit their own costs. This is easily displayed in seeing the appeal rate for those 2 million denials of coverage was just 11% (or about 220,000). Of those appeals, a full 82% were overturned (or about 180,400). An Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report found more than 10% of a small sample of denials were “inappropriate” and would have generally been covered by traditional Medicare. It’s safe to say, at least 200,000 patients in Medicare Advantage plans alone have experienced delayed, medically necessary care…just because.
All of this incredibly noteworthy as the Biden Administration works to finalize an audit rule for Medicare Advantage plans which is expected to generate some potential $2 billion dollars returned to the government for overbilling, or claiming patients were sicker than they were. These payers are posed to argue simultaneously that patients don’t need medically necessary care despite being sicker than they actually are. It’s truly a remarkable moment to see predatory practices barrel their ways towards one another in the name of payer profits.
The New York Times piece notably reminds readers, when payers or even government officials argue for “cost savings”, they’re not necessarily talking about cost-savings for patients. The Inflation reduction Act, for example, requires manufacturers to refund the difference of medication’s cost rising higher than inflation to the government, but the government isn’t required to pass those savings make it back to patients. Again, to be fair, it might be particularly challenging for public program administrators to ensure those savings make it back to patients because those administrators are already saving plenty of money into their own pockets through bulk purchasing, already negotiating lower costs, and discount or rebate programs. On the double dipping end of the never-ending double dip, these same payers are fighting back against a series of programs run by medication manufacturers known patient assistance programs. The most common form of patient assistance programs is designed as co-pay assistance, helping patients cover their out-of-pocket costs of a particular medication. Right now, payers are using several dirty tricks to make sure they get the benefit of those billing dollars, rather than patients. The HIV + HepC Institute have joined other advocates in suing the Biden Administration over a rule issued under the previous administration to ensure those assistance programs designed to benefit patients and extend access to care are actually being used that way.
States are taking on efforts to combat abusive prior authorization practices introducing or having already passed “gold card” programs, in which providers with a history of successfully meeting prior authorization requirements in previous years may be exempt from needing to go through those processes for a certain period of time. The Biden Administration, for their part have also introduced a set of rules to streamline prior authorization processes, in an effort to expedite the experiences patients and providers have in navigating payment for care. And Congress is expected to see what was known as the Safe Step Act reintroduced this year, a bi-partisan and exceedingly popular piece of legislation aimed at curbing fail-first practices.
But patients, advocates, and policymakers should be careful about unintended consequences and keep an eye out for payers to adjust their practices. In gold-card programs, payers could just expand their prior authorization requirements, narrow formularies, and increase their rate of denials in order to disqualify providers who were previously qualified for the programs. We should also get creative in seeking to close some of these loopholes in the Affordable Care Act’s promise to bring a more equitable and easier to navigate health care landscape. Introducing parity between medical benefit profit caps (known as medical loss ratio) and pharmacy benefit profit caps might encourage (read: require) pharmacy benefit managers to share the savings, have discounts follow patients, expand formularies, and otherwise ensure their program dollars are being used to the maximum benefit of patients.